

From Fuzzy Sets to Mathematical Logic

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Zadeh's **Fuzzy Set Theory** is an important method in dealing with vagueness in applied sciences.

Fuzzy logic in broad sense includes phenomena related to fuzziness and is oriented to real-world applications, while **mathematical fuzzy logic** develops mathematical methods to model vagueness and fuzziness by well-defined logical tools.

These two approaches **do not often meet each other**; we try to bridge the gap between practical applications of Fuzzy Set Theory and mathematical fuzzy logic.

Our guiding principle is to **explain in logic terms the fuzzy logic concepts** that are used in many real world applications, **thus we stay as close as possible to practical applications of fuzzy sets.**

Our approach is **different from the mainstream approach**, where the idea is to **generalize classical first order** logic concepts to many valued logics.

We demonstrate how continuous $[0, 1]$ -valued fuzzy sets can be naturally interpreted as open formulas in a simple first order fuzzy logic of Pavelka style. Our main idea is to **understand truth values as continuous functions**;

- for single elements $x_0 \in X$ the truth values are **constant functions** defined by the membership degree $\mu_\alpha(x_0)$,
- for open formulas $\alpha(x)$ they are the **membership functions** $\mu_\alpha : X \curvearrowright [0, 1]$, where the base set X is scaled to the unit interval $[0, 1]$,
- for universally closed formulas $\forall x \alpha(x)$ truth values are **definite integrals understood as constant functions**. We also introduce existential quantifiers \exists^a , where $a \in [0, 1]$.

In the usual mathematical fuzzy logic approaches,

- the truth value of **universally closed formulas** $\forall x\alpha(x)$ is interpreted via **infimum**: $v(\forall x\alpha(x)) = \bigwedge_a v(\alpha(a))$.

However, if for all a except one a_0 ,

$v(\alpha(a)) = 1$ and $v(\alpha(a_0)) = 0$; then $v(\forall x\alpha(x)) = 0$

and if for all b , $v(\alpha(b)) = 0$; then again $v(\forall x\alpha(x)) = 0$.

- the truth value of **existentially closed formulas** $\exists x\alpha(x)$ is interpreted via **supremum**: $v(\exists x\alpha(x)) = \bigvee_a v(\alpha(a))$.

However, the condition $v(\exists x\alpha(x)) = b \in [0, 1]$ does not imply that there really would exist some a such that $v(\alpha(a)) = b$.

- Mathematical fuzzy logics based on the above definitions are very **close to intuitionistic logic**, however, intuitionistic logic is commonly not accepted for the logic of fuzzy phenomena.

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
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This is our **starting point**, just a technical detail:

- we will scale X to the interval $[0, 1]$.

A fuzzy set $P(x)$ and its membership function $\bar{P}(x)$ set scaled to $[0, 1]$



In the **language** under consideration,

- there is a finite number of **unary predicates**, namely the fuzzy sets P, R, S, \dots, T and only **one free variable** x ; we use notation $P(x), R(x), S(x), \dots, T(x)$; they are (elementary) **open formulas**.
- $P(x_0)$, where $x_0 \in [0, 1]$, is a **constant formula** of the language.
- The **logical connectives** are **or**, **and**, **not**. For **implication connective** **imp** we abbreviate $\alpha \text{ imp } \beta := \text{not } \alpha \text{ or } \beta$.
- There is a **universal quantifier** \forall in the language. If $\alpha(x)$ is an open formula, then $\forall x \alpha(x)$ is a **closed formula**; read $\forall x \alpha(x)$ 'an average x has a property α '. - However, **not** $\forall x \alpha(x)$ is not in the language.

We have the following three principles

- 1. Language and semantics go in hand to hand.
- 2. Truth values are **continuous functions**
 $v(\alpha) : [0, 1] \curvearrowright [0, 1]$, denoted by $\bar{\alpha}$ (**There is only one valuation!**)
- 3. Logical **connectives**; by the standard MV-operations.

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Thus we define

- for **elementary open formulas** A ; $v(A(x)) = \bar{A}(x)$,
- for **constant formulas** $A(x_0)$, $v(A(x_0)) = \bar{a}(x)$, understood as constant function $\bar{a}(x) \equiv a$ and $\bar{A}(x_0) = a$.
- for formulas closed by the universal quantifier we set

$$v(\forall x \alpha(x)) = \int_0^1 \bar{\alpha}(x) dx = b,$$

where x is free variable in α , thus denoted by $\alpha(x)$, and the value b of the definite integral is understood as a constant function $\bar{b} : [0, 1] \curvearrowright [0, 1]$, $\bar{b}(x) \equiv b$.

We define formulas **closed by the existential quantifiers** \exists^a , justified by $x_0 \in [0, 1]$. If $v(\alpha(x_0)) = \bar{\alpha}(x_0) = a$, we set

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understood as a constant function $\bar{a}(x) \equiv a$. Thus there are infinitely many existential quantifiers \exists^a , one for each $a \in [0, 1]$. On the other hand, if there is no such $x_0 \in [0, 1]$ that $\bar{\alpha}(x_0) = a$, then $\exists^a x \alpha(x)$ is not defined. - not $\exists^a x \alpha(x)$ is not defined.

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Recall, if $v(\alpha) = \bar{\alpha}$ and $v(\beta) = \bar{\beta}$, then we interpret the logical connectives by point wise defined MV-operations;

$$\begin{aligned} v(\alpha \text{ and } \beta) &= \bar{\alpha} \odot \bar{\beta} = \max\{\bar{\alpha} + \bar{\beta} - 1, 0\}, \\ v(\alpha \text{ or } \beta) &= \bar{\alpha} \oplus \bar{\beta} = \min\{\bar{\alpha} + \bar{\beta}, 1\}, \\ v(\text{not } \alpha) &= [\bar{\alpha}]^* = 1 - \bar{\alpha}, \end{aligned}$$

Fundamental: Definite integrals distribute over MV-operations.

Notice that, by using Pavelka style notation, $\models_a \alpha$ has the same meaning than $v(\alpha) = \bar{a}$, where \bar{a} is the membership function – the only truth value – of α . Here we list tautologies that are taken schemas for logical axioms. It is a routine task to show that they are 1-tautologies whenever the corresponding formulas are defined

$$(T_1) \quad \models_1 \alpha \text{ imp } (\text{not not } \alpha),$$

$$(T_2) \quad \models_1 (\text{not } \alpha \text{ or not } \beta) \text{ imp not}(\alpha \text{ and } \beta),$$

$$(T_3) \quad \models_1 (\text{not } \alpha \text{ and not } \beta) \text{ imp not}(\alpha \text{ or } \beta),$$

$$(T_4) \quad \models_1 (\text{not } \alpha \text{ or } \beta) \text{ imp } (\alpha \text{ imp } \beta),$$

$$(T_5) \quad \models_1 (\alpha \text{ and not } \beta) \text{ imp not}(\alpha \text{ imp } \beta),$$

$$(T_6) \quad \models_1 (\text{not } \alpha(x_0) \text{ or } \beta) \text{ imp } (\exists^a x \alpha(x) \text{ imp } \beta),$$

where x_0 justifies $\exists^a \alpha(x)$,

$$(T_7) \quad \models_1 (\forall x \text{ not } \alpha(x) \text{ or } \beta) \text{ imp } (\forall x \alpha(x) \text{ imp } \beta).$$

Theorem

*All 1-tautologies of Pavelka's **propositional logic** are also 1-tautologies in our approach.*

In their seminal book Rasiowa and Sikorski list elementary classical tautologies for quantified formulas, numbered by $(T_{31}) - (T_{61})$. Since $\text{not } \forall x\alpha(x)$ and $\text{not } \exists^a x\alpha(x)$ are not formulas in our approach, tautologies $(T_{34}) - (T_{37})$ called *De Morgan laws* are not definable in our language. However,

Theorem

All the classical tautologies that are definable in our approach are 1-tautologies.

Next we list Pavelka style fuzzy rules of inference to ensure Completeness

Generalized Modus Ponens:

$$\frac{\alpha, \alpha \text{ imp } \beta}{\beta} \quad , \quad \frac{\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\gamma}}{\bar{\alpha} \odot \bar{\gamma}}$$

Rule of Bold Conjunction:

$$\frac{\alpha, \beta}{\alpha \text{ and } \beta} \quad , \quad \frac{\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\beta}}{\bar{\alpha} \odot \bar{\beta}}$$

Rule of Bold Disjunction:

$$\frac{\alpha, \beta}{\alpha \text{ or } \beta} \quad , \quad \frac{\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\beta}}{\bar{\alpha} \oplus \bar{\beta}}$$

Rules for existential quantifiers:

$$\frac{\alpha(x_0)}{\exists^a x \alpha(x)} \quad , \quad \frac{\bar{\alpha}(x_0) = \bar{a} \text{ for some } x_0 \in [0, 1]}{\bar{a}}$$

Rule for universal quantifier:

$$\frac{\alpha(x)}{\forall x \alpha(x)} \quad , \quad \frac{\bar{\alpha}(x)}{\int_0^1 \bar{\alpha}(x) dx}$$

We use Pavelka's definition of graded proof and establish

Theorem (Soundness and Completeness)

If the truth value (i.e. the degree of validity, as there is only one valuation) of a formula α is $\bar{\alpha}$, then there is also an \mathcal{R} -proof for α whose value is $\bar{\alpha}$ (by Soundness, this value cannot be greater than $\bar{\alpha}$)

Proof. By induction of the length of formulas.

- We have demonstrated a simple way from fuzzy sets to first order mathematical fuzzy logic.
- The basic idea is to understand the degree of membership as a continuous function.
- Universally closed formulas are then interpreted by definite integrals; this gives the opportunity to define the generalized quantifiers such as **almost all**, **most**, **many**, etc.
- The result is a sound and complete fuzzy logic in Pavelka's sense.
- Our approach is easy to implement e.g. for Matlab or Maple program (work in progress).